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Hargrave’s Nightmare and Taney’s Dream 
Michael Meranze* 
An energetic government is our true policy, and it will at last be 
discovered, and prevail. 
—Charles Pinckney1 
I .......................................................................................................................................... 221 
II ......................................................................................................................................... 227 
III ....................................................................................................................................... 233 
 
Shortly after the conclusion of the Federal Convention of 1787, Charles 
Pinckney of South Carolina published a pamphlet. Entitled Observations on the Plan 
of Government Submitted to the Federal Convention in Philadelphia, on the 28th of May, 1787, 
Pinckney’s pamphlet suggested that it represented a speech given in Congress, 
although, as the title page indicated, the thoughts were presented “at different 
Times in the course of their [the Convention’s] Discussions.”2 Several oddities 
present themselves in the pamphlet: there was no plan of government submitted 
on May 28,3 Pinckney’s own plan was presented on May 29 and pushed aside,4 and 
the pamphlet itself does not detail either his plan or his critique of other plans that 
had been presented to the Convention5 (although it does offer a critique of the 
Articles of Confederation6). Nor was the pamphlet particularly influential. I 
mention both the oddities and the marginality because I am not claiming that the 
pamphlet deserves extended analysis because of its centrality to constitutional 
debate. But I do want to spend time with it because it takes us to the heart of the 
 
* Department of History, University of California, Los Angeles. I would like to thank Ruth Bloch, 
Holly Brewer, Al Brophy, Trevor Burnard, Matthew Crow, Helen Deutsch, David Garland, Edward 
Gray, Steven Hahn, Norman Spaulding, Chris Tomlins, and the participants in the “Law As . . . ” II 
workshop at the University of California, Irvine School of Law for their helpful comments and 
criticisms. 
1. Charles Pinckney, Observations on the Plan of Government Submitted to the Federal 
Convention, in Philadelphia, on the 28th of May, 1787, in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 106, 106 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter RECORDS]. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 108. 
4. Appendix D, The Pickney Plan, in 3 RECORDS, supra note 1, at 595, 595. 
5. Pinckney, supra note 1, at 106. 
6. See id. at 10821. 
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issues that I want to raise in this Essay and because the pamphlet takes us to 
Charles Pinckney. 
Pinckney, a scion of an old planter family, son of an alleged loyalist, and 
spokesman for slave-holding interests, is perhaps most famous for his assertion in 
the Federal Convention that “if the Committee should fail to insert some security 
to the Southern States ag[ainst] an emancipation of slaves, and taxes on exports, 
he sh[ould] be bound by duty to his State to vote ag[ainst] their Report.”7 
Pinckney appears here as the predictable voice of the slave-owning class, 
threatening the existence of the Union if there was no accommodation on slavery 
(or perhaps, more accurately, if the northern states did not concede to the will of 
southerners on slavery). In this pose, he appears as a familiar figure in the political 
history of the United States—the aggressively localistic planter, curbing national 
power with the unbridled confidence of his class. It is easy enough to trace a line 
from this posture down through the Nullification Crisis8 to John C. Calhoun’s 
famous speech on the Compromise of 18509 and then into Civil War. 
But two things suggest a different way of approaching his intervention. The 
first was his ongoing insistence in the Observations on the importance of “energetic 
government.”10 Pinckney rivaled Alexander Hamilton in his advocacy of a firm 
national state. The second is the almost palpable anxiety in his statement to the 
Committee on Detail: the fear that the Constitution might move against slaves or 
exports.11 Pinckney thereby found himself caught in a dilemma as he strove to 
create a powerful national state, but also sought to make sure it did not have the 
power to emancipate slaves or intrude into the southern economy. To be sure, in a 
traditional way of accounting for the Constitution, this issue seems beside the 
point: Pinckney had served in Congress, and so, one might argue, he simply had 
become a nationalist and his desire for a stronger government grew out of his fear 
of the excesses of democracy. Slavery, while important for hobbling the new State, 
played little role in creating it. His desire for “energetic government” and his fear 
of it simply played in different registers. 
But, despite the herculean efforts of Gordon Wood,12 it is no longer possible 
to understand the construction of the American constitutional state disconnected 
from the history of slavery. As scholars such as Mark Graber, George William Van 
Cleve, and David Waldstreicher have argued, slavery was essential to the American 
 
7. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 355 
(Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (1840) (statements by Charles Pinckney). Pinckney’s 
comments took place on July 23 as a warning to the Committee on Detail. See id. 
8. WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY 
IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1816–1836, at xi (1966). 
9. IRVING H. BARTLETT, JOHN C. CALHOUN: A BIOGRAPHY 371 (1993). 
10. See Pinckney, supra note 1, at 108. 
11. See MADISON, supra note 7, at 355. 
12. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–
1787 (2d ed. 1998) (studying the various modes of American political thought from the Declaration of 
Independence to the ratification of the Constitution). 
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Constitution in the pre-Civil War period.13 For Christopher Tomlins, to take 
another recent example, slavery all but defined the first constitutional order of the 
United States in its power to shape both labor relations and civic personality.14 In 
the aftermath of these scholars, any work that claims that the history of slavery 
was not central to the meaning of America’s statehood or law fails to comprehend 
the American past as a whole.15 
However, while these works all demonstrate the importance of slavery in 
shaping the constitutional order, there is another equally important issue that we 
need to confront: the ways that the Constitution and its new order reshaped the 
visibility and security of slavery itself. The new historiography insists that 
slaveholders imagined themselves under siege in the Revolutionary period and 
dominated the outcome of constitutional struggle. But it does so without 
addressing how the Constitution and constitutionalism enabled the transition from 
imagined weakness to consolidated strength. But the preeminent importance of 
slavery to the history of the United States was itself an effect of the Constitution; 
the constitutional settlement ensured that slavery would be simultaneously 
vulnerable, reinforced, concealed, and made visible from 1789–1865. It is that 
issue—the question of constitutional alchemy—that I want to raise in this Essay. 
To do that, I want to start by retelling some old stories. 
I 
The relationship between revolution, constitutional order, and slavery was 
formed around the 1772 case Somerset v. Stewart.16 The basic facts of the case are 
well known. James Somerset, enslaved to Charles Stewart in Virginia, having been 
brought to England by Stewart, left his master and refused to return to colonial 
slavery.17 Stewart hired Captain John Knowles to seize Somerset and to hold him 
in his ship’s brig until Stewart was able to return Somerset to Virginia, slavery, and 
likely sale.18 In response, Granville Sharp and a coterie of antislavery lawyers and 
activists filed for a writ of Habeas Corpus under which Somerset was delivered up 
to King’s Bench and the authority of Lord Mansfield.19 In the end, Mansfield 
ruled that, under the Laws of England, neither Knowles nor Stewart had the legal 
right to seize and forcibly remove Somerset.20 Consequently, Mansfield granted 
 
13. MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 9396 
(2006); GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A SLAVEHOLDERS’ UNION 29 (2010); DAVID 
WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION 311 (2009). 
14. CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND: LAW, LABOR, AND CIVIC IDENTITY IN 
COLONIZING ENGLISH AMERICA, 15801865, at 51215 (2010). 
15. Id.; see GRABER, supra note 13; VAN CLEVE, supra note 13; WALDSTREICHER, supra note 13. 
16. Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.) 510. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
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Somerset his release, and Somerset moved into the Afro-British population and 
disappeared from the historical record.21 
Somerset v. Stewart was a cause célèbre in its time as it has been since. Despite 
Mansfield’s efforts to find some settlement and to avoid having to deliver a 
verdict, forces on both sides of the issues—antislavery activists in England and 
West Indian Planter interests in the colonies and metropolis—were determined to 
press the case forward. Somerset’s lawyers—among the most esteemed attorneys 
available—pressed a wide range of arguments against slavery itself, including, but 
not limited to, claims that the nature of English liberty precluded it from occurring 
in Britain.22 Equally impressive, attorneys for Stewart pressed the long history of 
slavery, its importance to the British Empire, and the many ways in which it had 
been both explicitly and implicitly acknowledged in imperial law. The trial, in other 
words, provided a forum for a wide-ranging debate over the legitimacy of the 
slave trade and colonial slavery. And the contemporary public knew it. 
Newspapers in England and the colonies reported on the case, while versions of 
the case’s history and Mansfield’s judgment circulated in both Britain and the 
colonial world. Much of the discussion—then and now—has focused on what 
exactly Mansfield meant: Did he really intend to outlaw slavery in England? Was 
the decision secretly an attack on colonial slavery? Did he simply reaffirm earlier 
decisions or dramatically change the law of slavery itself?23 
In part, this controversy stems from Mansfield’s cryptic language. Rather 
than basing his decision on slavery per se (as Somerset’s attorneys had urged) or 
dismissing it as simply a question of protecting property rights (as Stewart’s 
attorneys had argued), Mansfield narrowed the decision to the question of the 
forcible seizing of the body and whether or not “[s]o high an act of dominion” 
could take place without the sanction of “the country where it is used.”24 Noting 
that “[t]he power of a master over his slave has been extremely different, in 
different countries,”25 Mansfield ruled that this particular power of seizure failed 
to have the necessary legal authority within England.26 And so, he found, “the 
black must be discharged.”27 Mansfield’s decision, thereby, did not address slavery 
per se but rather its multiple forms and privileges while limiting those forms in 
England (perhaps to conform to what George Van Cleve has recently dubbed 
“near slavery”28). 
Although narrowly tailored as a decision, Mansfield did use more sweeping 
 
21. Id. at 499. 
22. Id. at 503. 
23. For a recent review and rehearsal of those questions, see the debate between George Van 
Cleve, Daniel Hulsebosch, and Ruth Paley in George Van Cleve, Somerset’s Case and Its Antecedents in 
Imperial Perspective, 24 LAW & HIST. REV 601, 619, 62427 (2006). 
24. Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 510. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Van Cleve, supra note 23, at 60710. 
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language in his justification. Slavery, he insisted, “is of such a nature, that it is 
incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political . . . . [I]t’s so 
odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law.”29 Mansfield’s 
language led to a long-standing belief that he had outlawed slavery in England, a 
point that would help fuel antislavery activity in both Britain and the United 
States. There are reasons to doubt the validity of this claim (even while 
acknowledging its political import). England continued to be the home of 
enslaved people and Somerset v. Stewart did not provide a stable legal precedent. 
Moreover, Mansfield was doing little but paraphrasing Grotius’ much earlier 
position on the basis of slavery: “‘[A]part from human institutions and customs, 
no men can be slaves; and it is in this sense that legal writers maintain that slavery 
is repugnant to nature.’”30 
Still, as is so often the case with history, context is all. Somerset v. Stewart 
struck at the rights of colonial slaveholders and the relationship between colonial 
slavery and Britain. That it occurred in 1772 was not insignificant. As David 
Waldstreicher has argued, Mansfield’s decision should not be separated from the 
larger crises besetting the British Empire.31 Indeed, Waldstreicher suggests we 
would do well to think of Somerset as opening up what he terms a “Mansfieldian 
moment,”—defined as that point “when it becomes impossible to deal with key 
constitutional questions without engaging in the politics of slavery.”32 More 
specifically, Somerset, occurring as it did in the midst of the imperial crisis, seemed 
to open up a chasm between English and colonial institutions by implicitly 
denying colonial claims to a common law justification for their institutions. 
Somerset thereby undermined the presumed parity between colonial and 
metropolitan legal rights and potentially threw colonists into the ambit of 
Blackstone’s theory of colonial governance.33 And that was not a stable place for 
the colonists to be. 
Blackstone, after all, explicitly denied to colonists their claims to the English 
common law. In his famous exposition of the constitutional status of colonies, 
Blackstone differentiated between those colonies that were merely settled (and 
therefore whose colonists carried the common law with them) and those either 
conquered or ceded (in which the constitutional order was at the discretion of the 
King).34 When conquest was of another Christian country, the old laws remained 
in force till the King decided otherwise; when of an “infidel” country, the old laws 
 
29. Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 510. 
30. Sally E. Hadden, The Fragmented Laws of Slavery in the Colonial and Revolutionary Eras, in 1 THE 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 253, 257 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins 
eds., 2008) (quoting HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS bk. III, ch. VII, § 1 (1625)). 
31. WALDSTREICHER, supra note 13, at 4041. 
32. Id. at 41. 
33. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 4, at 10406 
(William S. Hein & Co. 1992) (1765). 
34. Id. at 10405. 
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were abrogated immediately and legal order was dependent on the sovereign.35 
The American colonies, as the home of Native Americans, fell under the latter 
category: 
Our American plantations are principally of this latter sort, being 
obtained in the last century either by right of conquest and driving out 
the natives (with what natural justice I shall not at present enquire) or by 
treaties. And therefore the common law of England, as such, has no 
allowance or authority there; they being no part of the mother country, 
but distinct (though dependent) dominions.36 
For Blackstone, the aim of this claim lay in his successive assertion that the 
colonies “are subject however to the control of the parliament” and his 
implication that although the colonies had forms of government that aped that of 
England, they had no real sovereign power in them.37 
Blackstone therefore elevated the history of territory over the history of the 
subject (at least in the colonies). In his telling, the relationship between the 
sovereign and a particular space determined which rights inhered in any 
settlement. To be sure, there was an ambiguity here: was Blackstone implying that 
individual colonial subjects had no claim on the common law or was he speaking 
only of corporate rights? (And it may be that this Blackstonian background is one 
powerful argument for the corporate rather than individualist reading of the 
Declaration of Independence.) But, when combined with Mansfield’s ruling in 
Somerset, colonists (and colonial slaveholders in particular) were thrown back on 
their own territories if they wished to ensure their property rights and forced to 
confront the limits of their own authority in any conflict with Parliament. In this 
light, it is no surprise that colonial newspapers covered the Somerset case and its 
implications with great avidity.38 
There is, however, one more aspect of the structure laid out by Blackstone 
and Mansfield that I want to raise here. For Mansfield, despite the narrowness of 
his ruling, the question turned on the issue of high dominion. As Mansfield 
indicated, the case arose because Somerset had refused to leave England when 
commanded to do so: “[T]he slave departed and refused to serve; whereupon he 
was kept, to be sold abroad. So high an act of dominion must be recognized by 
the law of the country where it is used.”39 Here the question exceeds the 
relationship of the slave owner to the enslaved and moves to the question of the 
possible forms of dominion within a country. 
It is not hard to hear in this phrasing a diminished echo of part of Francis 
Hargrave’s arguments in support of James Somerset: 
The right, clamed by Mr. Steuart to the detention of the negro, is 
 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 105. 
37. Id. 
38. VAN CLEVE, supra note 13, at 3337. 
39. Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.) 510. 
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founded on the condition of slavery, in which he was before his master 
brought him into England; and if that right is here recognized, domestick 
slavery, with its horrid train of evils, may be lawfully imported into this 
country, at the discretion of every individual foreign and native. It will 
come not only from our own colonies, and those of other European 
nations; but from Poland, Russia, Spain, and Turky, from the coast of 
Barbary, from the Western and Eastern coasts of Africa; from every part 
of the world, where it still continues to torment and dishonour the 
human species. It will be transmitted to us in all it’s various forms, in all 
the gradations of inventive cruelty; and by an universal reception of 
slavery, this country, so famous for publick liberty, will become the chief 
seat of private tyranny.40 
To be sure, Hargrave was engaged in a certain form of political myth making. 
There were enslaved men, women, and children in England, and the “publick 
liberty” of England had many limits.41 Moreover, the effort to exoticize slavery 
either as a colonial growth or as a sign of the backwardness of Eastern Europe, 
the Mediterranean, and Africa served to avoid confronting metropolitan England’s 
role in shaping modern slavery. 
But there is something more at work here. Hargrave is doing more than 
anticipating Jefferson’s famous depiction of the effects of slavery on owners and 
slaves.42 Instead, he dissolves the distinction between the right to own human 
beings and the systematic effects of slavery on the surrounding society and 
constitutional order. At stake in Hargrave’s peroration is not only the liberty of 
Somerset, but also the liberty of all those around him—whether enslaved or not. 
Slavery in this telling will infect any constitutional order in which it is placed—
infect it with tyranny that is. 
The tag team of Blackstone and Mansfield then opened up a large front of 
danger for colonial slaveholders. Admittedly, Blackstone himself was more 
concerned with Parliamentary Supremacy during the Imperial Crisis, and 
Mansfield sought to shield West Indian interests as well as he could. But the dual 
effect of their writings was to reduce colonial slavery to a mere local, legal 
institution. Denied either common law support or the protection of the rights of 
Englishmen, slavery could not assert constitutional status and faced the danger of 
legislative intervention. 
Indeed, for the Jamaicans Edward Long and Bryan Edwards the ultimate 
result of Mansfield’s decision was the opposite of Hargrave’s worries. For them, 
the potential effect of the decision was to erode slavery everywhere and to 
eliminate the distinctions between British subjects and enslaved individuals.43 As 
 
40. FRANCIS HARGRAVE, AN ARGUMENT IN THE CASE OF JAMES SOMMERSETT, A NEGRO 
11 (London, W. Otridge 1772). There was also a Boston edition in 1774. 
41. Id. 
42. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 28889 (Richmond, VA, J.W. 
Randolph 1853). 
43. See Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 510. 
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they argued, the Empire depended on slavery and the labor of slavery, and the 
Parliament and judges of England had long approved it. To strike at the power of 
the master in England was to lift the power of a judge over the power of 
Parliament. Its result would be to encourage disobedience among the enslaved, 
cause them to try to escape their masters, seek out liberty in England, and dissolve 
the boundaries of law and race.44 Eighty years before Abraham Lincoln’s famous 
remark, figures on both sides of the Somerset case began to suggest that a “house 
divided against itself can not stand.”45 
In mainland British America, the intensification of freedom suits—assertive 
political claims by the enslaved, the effort of Lord Dunmore to enlist the slaves of 
patriots, the eager response of the slaves, and, not to mention, the disruption of 
the power of colonial state authority to impose itself in protection of slave owners’ 
property rights during the Revolutionary War—all deepened the challenge to the 
legal security of slavery. It is true, as both George William Van Cleve and Aziz 
Rana have insisted, there were powerful countervailing forces supporting 
slavery—not least the widespread racism and indifference to the plight of the 
enslaved that existed through the mainland colonies and England.46 No one 
should imagine that the institution of slavery faced an imminent threat of 
destruction in the 1770s and 1780s. But we need to recognize the possibility that 
slave owners would lose “their” property and that slavery might have faced 
unprecedented political and legal challenge. 
Somerset v. Stewart marked the emergence, in Michel Foucault’s terms, of a 
new constitutional and juridical “problematization” of slavery.47 Foucault argued 
in his late work that we could most productively approach the history of thought 
as a series of problematizations (i.e., as historically localizable structures of 
argument and reflection that defined the space of a discursive controversy or 
object).48 Importantly, a problematization could not be reduced to either its 
background social practices or one of its arguments. It was not ideology, but 
rather a space in which ideologies, laws, texts, questions, and answers could 
emerge and be meaningful to actors.49 My suggestion, then, is that regardless of 
any of the actors’ intentions, and even in the absence of an organized antislavery 
 
44. See A PLANTER, CANDID REFLECTIONS UPON THE JUDGEMENT LATELY AWARDED BY 
THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH IN WESTMINSTER-HALL, ON WHAT IS COMMONLY CALLED THE 
NEGROE-CAUSE § 5, at 4662 (London, T. Lowndes 1772); SAMUEL ESTWICK, CONSIDERATIONS 
ON THE NEGROE CAUSE COMMONLY SO CALLED, ADDRESSED TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE 
LORD MANSFIELD, LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH, & C. 6977, 9293 
(London, J. Dodsely 3d ed. 1788). 
45. Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 502, 504. 
46. AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 85 (2010); VAN CLEVE, supra 
note 13, at 3440. 
47. Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations: An Interview with Michel Foucault, in 1 THE ESSENTIAL 
WORKS OF MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1954–1984: ETHICS: SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH 111, 11719 (Paul 
Rabinow ed., Robert Hurley et al. trans., New Press 1997) (1994). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
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movement,50 Somerset established a problematization within which the question of 
the constitutional status and visibility of slavery, the relationship between the 
constitutional claims of slavery and local, legal regimes, and the necessity to 
slavery of the support of the state became unavoidable. 
II 
There were three national constitutional moments in Revolutionary America: 
the Articles of Confederation, the Federal Constitution of 1787–1789, and the 
flourish of amendments produced by the First U.S. Congress that have come 
down to us as the “Bill of Rights.” Traditionally, scholars have seen a dialectic 
between these moments51 whereby the engaged democracy and localism of the 
moment of independence—local sovereignties reinforced in their resistance to an 
expanding and transforming Imperial power—led, as a result of ongoing domestic 
and international crises, to an elite diagnosis of excessive democracy which in its 
turn led—in the Federal Constitution of 1787—to a more formidable but less 
democratic nation-state and constitutional order. But given the degree of 
resistance to that last turn, opponents of the new Federal Constitution forced its 
supporters to enact a series of amendments restricting the reach of national 
power, and securing those rights that have become almost synonymous with 
American self-understanding. 
In terms of this story of national consolidation and rights, slave owners qua 
slave owners play a limiting role—insisting throughout the process on the 
limitation of federal power. Slave owners as nationalists figure largely in this story, 
but when their interests as owners of human property are at stake, it seems the 
emphasis is consistently on limiting the power of the national state.52 But this 
story understates the connections between slavery and the strengthening of the 
national state, and why slave owners viewed that strengthening as necessary not 
simply for the State but for slavery itself. Instead, the constitutional moments of 
revolutionary America served successively to provide slave owners with a system 
of support to guard them, and their institution, from internal and external threats. 
 
50. In making this point, I do not want to deny that Somerset’s allies (beginning with 
Granville Sharp) and Stewart’s backers (especially the West Indian Planter Interest) did not force a 
test case as a way of testing the power of antislavery arguments. But I do think that these intentions 
fall short of the sort of organized antislavery movements that emerged beginning in the 1780s and 
that helped propel forward a new politics of slavery. For more on these issues, see CHRISTOPHER 
LESLIE BROWN, MORAL CAPITAL: FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH ABOLITIONISM 10001 (2006). 
51. See, e.g., Christopher L. Tomlins, The Threepenny Constitution (and the Question of Justice), 58 
ALA. L. REV. 979, 9881001 (2007). 
52. The classic statement of this dialectic remains in WOOD, supra note 12. But for one recent 
version of this story, see Jack N. Rakove, Confederation and Constitution, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY 
OF LAW IN AMERICA: EARLY AMERICA (1580–1815) 482, 482517 (Michael Grossberg & 
Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). His treatment of Madison and Randolph’s constitutional visions as 
disconnected from their representing a slave-owning class is symptomatic of this narrative 
perspective. Id. at 491508. 
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Slavery was central to the United States constitutional order, but the new 
constitutional order also transformed and reconstituted slavery on a new terrain. 
Let me begin with the Articles of Confederation and the way that the 
Articles structured the problem left to revolutionary politicians by the Somerset 
case. In Articles IVand IX, arguably the two key clauses of the Articles concerning 
slavery, the Continental Congress took up the challenge of Somerset in such a way 
as to limit Mansfield’s reach without committing the new nation to a deeper 
immersion in the international system of slavery and the slave trade. 
Article IX seeks to thread a needle between the demands for nation-building 
(the supremacy of Confederal treaties and diplomacy) and the perpetuation of 
state sovereignty over its own borders (treaties cannot grant foreigners trade rights 
denied to the citizens of a state or deny states the right to determine what can and 
cannot be imported and exported within their borders). Part of Article IX laid out 
the parameters of the Confederation Congress’s treaty-making powers: 
The United States in Congress assembled shall have the sole and 
exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war, except in the 
cases mentioned in the sixth article—of sending and receiving 
ambassadors—entering into treaties and alliances, provided, that no treaty of 
commerce shall be made, whereby the legislative power of the respective States shall be 
restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners, as their own people are 
subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods 
or commodities whatsoever—of establishing rules for deciding, in all cases, 
what captures on land or water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes 
taken by land or naval forces in the service of the United States shall be 
divided or appropriated—of granting letters of marque and reprisal in 
times of peace—appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies 
committed on the high seas, and establishing courts for receiving and 
determining finally appeals in all cases of captures, provided that no 
member of Congress shall be appointed a judge of any of the said 
courts.53 
But, in a world fractured by Somerset, Article IX left a gaping hole: What were 
the obligations of the Confederation to the internal rules of each state and what 
were the obligations of each state to each other? 
The answers to those questions can be found in Article IV and they 
demonstrate the continuation of the problematization inaugurated in Somerset. 
Article IV moved through three steps. The first aimed to secure property rights 
across state borders: 
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse 
among the people of the different States in this Union, the free 
inhabitants of each of these States, (paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives 
from justice excepted,) shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free 
citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and 
 
53. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 1 (emphasis added). 
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regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade 
and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the 
inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far 
as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State to any other State, of 
which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also that no imposition, duties or 
restriction shall be laid by any State, on the property of the United States, 
or either of them.54 
The second ensured that states would be obliged to turn over fugitives from 
justice: 
If any person guilty of or charged with, treason, felony or other high 
misdemeanor in any State, shall flee from justice, and be found in any of 
the United States, he shall, upon demand of the Governor or executive 
power of the State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to 
the State having jurisdiction of his offense.55 
And the third ensured that each state would act with juridical comity: “Full 
faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts and 
judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State.”56 
Between Article IV and Article IX, then, the Confederation Congress sought 
to reestablish, within the new nation, the colonial understanding of the imperial 
law of slavery prior to Mansfield’s decision. Importantly, Article IX allowed states 
to control imports—thus allowing Virginia to ban slave importation and South 
Carolina to continue it—but only from international sources.57 Article IV aimed to 
prevent the possibility for a state to insist—as did England in Somerset—that slave 
owners risked their full control over their human property by crossing state lines.58 
Nor is this structure only apparent in retrospection. As George William Van Cleve 
has shown in a careful analysis, the Continental Congress added Article IV in 
order to protect slave owners from the implications of an unbridled Article IX.59 
Indeed, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV was only added after 
the addition of Article IX. As Van Cleve concludes, the Continental Congress 
shaped these Articles to protect slave owners from the obvious implications of the 
Somerset decision.60 
In the moment, the Articles were unable to provide the safe harbor that slave 
owners desired. There were several reasons for this failure: despite successfully 
prosecuting Independence, the Confederation government did not have the 
coercive power to maintain social order throughout the southern states, its ability 
 
54. Id. at art. IV, para. 1 (emphasis added). 
55. Id. at art. IV, para. 2. 
56. Id. at art. IV, para. 3 (emphasis added). 
57. Id. at art. IV, para. 1–3; id. at art. IX, para. 1. 
58. As various tensions around Pennsylvania’s gradual emancipation law would show, this 
effort was not entirely successful. 
59. VAN CLEVE, supra note 13, at 5056. 
60. Id. Van Cleve has provided the most engaged reading of the drafting of these clauses and 
the struggles they engendered. 
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to command state courts to obey its injunctions was limited, and the claim of the 
Articles to supremacy over state laws was always contested. To be sure, some of 
these problems were due to southern resistance, at the moment of independence, 
to a stronger national union and, particularly, to a more powerful taxation 
regime.61 
But the problems rebounded back on the slave-holding states and intensified 
their danger from war and internal uprising. George Washington articulated the 
particular logic of real weakness of the slave-holding states—while of course never 
making it explicit—in a letter to his nephew Bushrod Washington. First, in taking 
on the critics of the Constitution in Virginia he ridiculed the notion that they had 
any effective alternative to approving the new Union: 
What line of conduct they would advise it to adopt, if nine other States 
would accede to it, of which I think there is little doubt? Would they 
recommend that it should stand on its own basis—seperate & distinct 
from the rest? Or would they connect it with Rhode Island, or even say 
two others, checkerwise, & remain with them as outcasts from the 
Society, to shift for themselves? Or will they advise a return to our 
former dependence on Great Britain for their protection & support?62 
We should not overlook Washington’s absolute certainty that Virginia could 
not survive on its own. And the reason it could not survive on its own ultimately 
lay in its slave system: 
I am sorry to add in this place that Virginians entertain too high an 
opinion of the importance of their own Country. In extent of territory—
In number of Inhabitants (of all descriptions) & In wealth I will readily grant 
that it certainly stands first in the Union; but in point of strength, it is, 
comparatively, weak. To this point, my opportunities authorise me to 
speak, decidedly; and sure I am, in every point of view, in which the 
subject can be placed, it is not (considering also the Geographical 
situation of the State) more the interest of any one of them to 
confederate, than it is the one in which we live.63 
Washington’s distinction between wealth and strength points to the chasm at 
the heart of the slave societies. As Van Cleve points out, it is likely that 
Washington’s reference to inhabitants “of all descriptions” is a clear reference to 
slaves (and much like the similar code in the Constitution itself).64 Moreover, 
Washington’s reminder of his own military expertise hearkens back to the 1786 
debate over the treaty with Spain and the recognition—on the part of at least 
some southern leaders—that, under the Confederation, the United States simply 
 
61. On these points, see ROBIN L. EINHORN, AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY 
(2006); VAN CLEVE, supra note 13, at 11434. 
62. Letter from George Washington to Bushrod Washington (Nov. 9, 1787), in GEORGE 
WASHINGTON: WRITINGS 659, 66061 (John Rhodehamel ed., 1997). 
63. Id. I am indebted to George Van Cleve’s reading of this passage. See VAN CLEVE, supra 
note 13, at 111. 
64. VAN CLEVE, supra note 13, at 111. 
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lacked the military capacity to defend southern interests regarding the Mississippi 
River and more generally the old Southwest.65 
The danger facing the slave regimes from both internal and external violence 
becomes even clearer if we recall Robin Blackburn’s important reminder that “one 
way of describing New World slavery would be to say that it embodied a frozen 
war of the races.”66 If we recall that the slave-owning states had just completed 
one war against Britain and were surrounded by hostile New World empires, the 
military threats become even clearer. During the Revolutionary War, one reason 
behind the willingness of some South Carolinians to let African Americans join 
the Continental Army was their recognition that free white men could not be 
spared because they were needed in the state to police the enslaved population. As 
they explained to a committee of Congress, “‘by reason of the great proportion of 
citizens necessary to remain at home to prevent insurrection among the Negroes 
and to prevent the desertion of them to the enemy,’” the South Carolina militia 
was not strong enough to carry the fight.67 And if we further recall the weaknesses 
of southern tax systems, the impossibility of fighting on their own becomes even 
clearer again. For all of the deep-rooted localism of the southern states, they 
needed a powerful, legitimated, national constitutional order to protect them. 
It is this peculiar situation that helps explain one of the most striking aspects 
of the Federal Convention of 1787: that the two most nationalistic and centralized 
proposals before the convention were proffered by slave-owning states.68 Both the 
Virginia Plan69 (presented by Edmund Randolph, although mostly the handiwork 
of James Madison) that established the tone of the Convention and Charles 
Pickney’s plan70 (tabled almost immediately but with serious overlap with the 
Virginia Plan) each demonstrated a slave-owning class that was not powerfully 
self-assured but one that recognized the many vulnerabilities of its social system. 
Whereas the southerners would fight hard, and successfully, to ensure that the 
new constitutional order posed little threat to their institution, it is important to 
recognize that they wanted that new constitutional order badly. Indeed, they were 
convinced they needed a system in which their fellow citizens would come to the 
aid of slavery when required. 
I am not going to revisit the details of the Federal Convention here, nor am I 
going to revisit the numerous clauses devoted to the protection of slavery (the 
clauses tying representation and taxation to the enslaved, the postponement of the 
right to abolish the slave-trade, the fugitive slave clause, the assurance of 
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68. Mark Graber offers the contrary argument to mine on this issue. GRABER, supra note 13, 
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69. See Pinckney, supra note 1, at 10910. 
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suppression of domestic insurrection, the privileges and immunities clause, the 
contracts clause, etc.).71 But I do want to point to one moment in the Convention 
as a way of bringing home this issue of southern anxiety: Rufus King’s 
provocative antislavery speech. King, a member of the Massachusetts delegation, 
sought to mobilize opposition within the Convention over the clear proslavery 
drift of the discussions and the definition of representation. He did so by pointing 
to the inherent instability and inequality that the slave trade produced: 
The admission of slaves was a most grating circumstance to his mind, & 
he believed would be so to a great part of the people of America. He had 
not made a strenuous opposition to it heretofore because he had hoped 
that this concession would have produced a readiness which had not 
been manifested, to strengthen the Genl Govt and to mark a full 
confidence in it. The Report under consideration had by the tenor of it, 
put an end to all those hopes. In two great points the hands of the 
Legislature were absolutely tied. The importation of slaves could not be 
prohibited—exports could not be taxed. Is this reasonable? What are the 
great objects of the Genl System? 1. defence agst foreign invasion. 2. agst 
internal sedition. Shall all the States then be bound to defend each; & 
shall each be at liberty to introduce a weakness which will render defence 
more difficult? Shall one part of the U.S. be bound to defend another 
part, and that other part be at liberty not only to increase its own danger, 
but to withhold the compensation for the burden?72 
In his inimitably unsubtle way, King had managed to put his finger on the 
constitutional revolution that the southern states were accomplishing: securing a 
nation-state powerful enough to protect them and ensure their expansion while 
limiting their burdens. And it is important here to recognize that King’s objections 
were rooted in the fundamental nature of a constitutional accord—that it removed 
issues from the power of the political branches. These were not questions of 
political balance but underlying structures. For all of the debates about balancing 
sectional interests in politics, it was regarding the fundamental law characteristics 
of the new order that King issued his challenge to the proslavery Constitution. If 
the structure of federalism combined with the organization of representation and 
taxation appeared, from the vantage point of slave-owning states, to contain the 
dangers raised in Somerset, King’s comments reveal another potentiality written 
into the constitutional accord—that the curtailment of Somerset would reduce the 
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north to the status of “distinct (though dependent) dominions,” in Blackstone’s 
words.73 
In this context, the Bill of Rights easily assumes its place. For the most part, 
a series of amendments designed to secure the right to a collective politics, the Bill 
of Rights,74 like the body of the Constitution, can also be read as providing double 
meaning in support of slavery: militias guaranteed in the Second Amendment, 
while present throughout the states, were essential in the south, whereas the Ninth 
and Tenth Amendments, while rarely drawn upon, were bulwarks against any 
tampering with slave laws. And, famously, the Fifth Amendment, which was 
designed to protect citizens against political prosecution could also, as Roger 
Taney would demonstrate, protect slave owners against the laws of nonslave 
states. But for the analysis I am offering, the Bill of Rights was most immediately 
significant for the added legitimacy it gave to the new Constitution. 
III 
Fair enough, one might easily say, but what is really different about this 
telling? Has it not been clear since the work of Donald Robinson and his 
contemporary heirs like David Waldstreicher and George William Van Cleve 
(from whom you borrow so liberally) that slavery shaped the Constitution? And if 
Waldstreicher and Van Cleve have so powerfully looked at the place of slavery in 
the early Republic, have Christopher Tomlins and Mark Graber not told this story 
from the other end, working backwards from the Crisis of the Union? Is this 
discussion much ado about what we already know? 
The answer is no. But in order to see that we need to step back from the 
narrative and examine some of its categories. Having done so, I hope I can then 
return to the narrative by focusing on Dred Scott and Somerset to show why the 
constitutional dimension of this history of slavery and the state matters so deeply. 
The recent historiography of the slaveholder’s constitution (Graber, Van 
Cleve, and Waldstreicher) makes two fundamental assumptions that need to be 
questioned. The first, that slavery’s power and security was fully formed and 
established, I have challenged in the previous sections. Although both Van Cleve75 
and Waldstreicher76 begin their accounts, as I have, with Somerset, and although 
Waldstreicher at least suggests that possibility of a meaningful antislavery moment 
in the 1780s77 (something Van Cleve downplays), by the point that they reach the 
Federal Convention of 1787, the instabilities and geopolitical challenges facing the 
slaveholding class are subsumed within a narrative of slavery’s power. But it is the 
second assumption that makes the first possible: for the recent history of what 
 
73. BLACKSTONE, supra note 33, at 105. 
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Waldstreicher and Van Cleve have called “slavery’s constitution” and “a 
slaveholders’ union,” respectively, is predicated on a reading of the constitutional 
settlement as a straightforward political compromise in juridical disguise.78 One 
can see this point most clearly in Van Cleve’s claim that the Missouri Controversy 
of 1819–1821 (when the United States almost split over the question of the 
admission of new states to the Union), which revealed that “the Constitution 
lacked the essential elements of a rule of law—agreed-upon moral foundations, 
allocations of political authority between levels of government, and judicial dispute 
resolution—where slavery was concerned.”79 
But to take this position is to ignore the most fundamental accomplishment 
of the Federal Convention and subsequent process of ratification: the 
constitutionalization of slavery itself. The recurrent crises and the ongoing judicial 
struggles over the relationship between slavery, slaveholders, non-slaveholders, 
slave states, and those states with few or no enslaved human beings were not a 
result of a failure of the rule of law. They were, instead, the effect of the very 
constitutionalization of slavery achieved in the late 1780s and 1790s. The United 
States’s response to the problem of Somerset was to raise it to the level of 
fundamental law, an act that ensured its constant visibility and the conflicts that 
resulted from that visibility and status. 
In this regard, the fundamental difference between the Articles of 
Confederation and the Federal Constitution lie less in specific clauses (after all, 
many of the most important clauses in the Constitution were preformed in the 
Articles) than in the latter’s elevation to fundamental law through the process of 
ratification. That the Federalists were disingenuous about their commitment to the 
sovereignty of the people seems clear,80 but their intentions, in this regard, are not 
the end of the matter. The decision to create special ratification conventions—a 
Revolutionary Era invention—established the distinction between constitutional 
and legislative law, and the insistence on a fixed text for ratification, whatever the 
resultant amendment process, meant that the written quality of the Constitution 
would itself be ratified through the process. This process of the ratification of a 
written constitution led to the peculiar trajectory of American constitutionalism 
(which still haunts constitutional debate today) as a popular tradition of reverence 
for a written text that serves to sacralize the constitutional order and consequently 
provides a potential moral basis for those institutions it recognizes. It was this 
movement from local positive law, under threat after Somerset, to a new 
constitutional status as an element of a fundamental legal system that transformed 
the nature of slavery and secured it at the heart of the American system. 
Indeed, one way to recognize this effect is to think through the space  
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between the British and the American consequences for the “Mansfieldian 
Moment,” starting with Somerset. When Mansfield denied slavery a fundamental 
status, and Parliament let his judgment stand, the British Empire remained 
multiple houses regarding slavery.81 But despite the weak tea of Federalism, the 
Constitution of 1787 did not allow for multiple houses—there was a nation-state 
not a composite empire. At that point, one must reverse David Waldstreicher’s 
formulation: it was not in the American “Mansfieldian Moment,” that “it becomes 
impossible to deal with key constitutional questions without engaging in the 
politics of slavery,” but that it became impossible to deal with key questions of 
slavery without engaging in constitutional debate.82 There was nothing pre-
ordained about these debates. But the persistence of slavery was interwoven with 
the persistence of the Constitution of 1787 and the Bill of Rights. And it was not a 
failure of law that slavery constantly returned to the Courts—it was the law’s 
effect. 
The significance of this transformation becomes clear when we try to 
understand and situate Roger Taney’s opinion in Scott v. Sandford.83 Dred Scott (as it 
is more commonly known) was, as you will recall, the result of the claim of Dred 
Scott that by virtue of his having been brought into “free” territory for an 
extended period, he was free.84 In taking this position, Scott and his attorneys 
drew upon a long-standing tradition of “sojourn” and “domicile” law that had 
developed in the early Republic in order to achieve comity between states.85 
Unfortunately for Dred Scott, the earlier emphasis on comity, which had 
encouraged deference to the state of residence rather than the state of 
enslavement, had broken down, and courts, especially southern courts, were 
insistently asserting the primacy of their own rules. As a result, courts that most 
likely would have ruled in favor of Scott (and his wife in a parallel suit) twenty 
years earlier now ruled against him. But what brought Scott v. Sandford before the 
Supreme Court was the claim that Scott and Sandford were citizens from different 
states and that, therefore, the Supreme Court had appropriate jurisdiction. In 
speaking for a divided Court, Taney famously ruled that Scott could not bring suit 
because slaves and the descendants of slaves “are not, and that they are not 
included, and were not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the 
Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that 
instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.”86 But he 
went further, establishing a firm distinction between state citizenship and Federal 
 
81. On the political reception of Somerset, see VAN CLEVE, supra note 13, at 32–38; JAMES 
WALVIN, THE ZONG: A MASSACRE, THE LAW, AND THE END OF SLAVERY 133–37 (2011). 
82. WALDSTREICHER, supra note 13, at 41. 
83. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
84. For a succinct explanation of the facts of the case, see TOMLINS, supra note 14, at 51215. 
85. Id. 
86. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404. 
           
236 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:219 
citizenship87, denying to Congress the right to forbid the spread of slavery into 
territories, and refusing to allow any state to forbid the holding of human property 
within its borders.88 
Essential to Taney’s argument was his effort to elide the distinction between 
the constitutional order of the United States and its colonial and confederation 
predecessors. Taney’s insistence that former slaves and their descendants could 
never be considered citizens of the United States was based not on any consistent 
denial of citizenship in the Confederation (as Donald Ferhenbacher demonstrated 
there was none89) or the bearing of rights in the Empire (where, after all, a post-
revolutionary notion of the citizen would have been anachronistic), but through a 
presentation (somewhat haphazard it has to be said) of laws relating to the 
different policing of “whites” and “blacks.” Taney’s argument made no effort to 
distinguish time and place or to think through the different constitutional systems 
within which they occurred.90 Indeed, to make these distinctions would have 
undermined the case he was building. Strikingly, Taney’s constitutional claims 
depend on his denying the singularity of the constitutional system he is 
interpreting. Taney seeks to make the Federal constitutional order coterminous 
with the entirety of the colonizing process. The history of America, in this telling, 
was a war of the races and the Constitution simply one moment in that history.91 
Law—even constitutional law—was a simple symptom of this underlying racial 
structure. Put another way, Taney aimed to make his constitutional argument by 
insisting that the Constitution—at least regarding the enslaved and their rights—
made no difference at all. 
Mark Graber and Christopher Tomlins have argued recently for the 
constitutional coherence of Taney’s opinion as it related to citizenship and its 
declaration that Congress could not ban slavery from the territories. They each, in 
different ways, take this position because of their understanding of the 
Constitution as an implicit sectional balancing act and of the Union as largely a 
result of transformed demographic realities (i.e., the competition for territories). I 
think that their arguments about Taney’s constitutional plausibility are persuasive 
but fail to see the true ground of that plausibility. In Graber’s case, his 
commitment to viewing the Constitution as the juridical form of an ongoing 
sectional compromise with “constitutional evil” causes him to follow Taney in 
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failing to recognize the importance of the distinct shift in the nature of 
jurisprudence from the early republic to the 1840s and 1850s.92 In Tomlins’s case, 
his acceptance of Graber’s historical reconstruction leads him to follow Taney in 
eliding the discontinuity introduced into the organization of slavery that occurred 
with the Federal Constitution of 1787 as well as its subsequent elaboration 
through the development of contested and constantly recurring constitutional 
struggle in the courts.93 The result is to render the Constitution qua Constitution 
as fundamentally unimportant.94 Paradoxically, the constitutionalization of slavery 
had proven so complete that it was impossible for Taney to imagine slavery’s 
history without the constitutional order; instead, he projected that Constitution 
back into the nature of the colonization process. 
To see what is missed in this perspective, we need to return to the arguments 
in Somerset. As you recall, Francis Hargrave envisioned a dystopian world in which 
polities would be unable to prevent the systematic expansion of slavery because 
individual slaveholders would be enabled to take their property wherever they 
pleased.95 It was that prospect that underwrote the political challenge of slavery to 
English liberty.96 Taney, in his recitation of colonial laws relating to the mixture of 
the “races,”97 hearkened back to the fears of Hargrave’s opponents (of the 
breaking of the color line) and instead solved that problem by embracing 
Hargrave’s nightmare. That he did so—overturning the entire problematic of 
Somerset as he did—by invoking the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment is a 
sign of the profound political discontinuity and disruption that the constitutional 
settlement enacted as fundamental law: 
Thus the rights of property are united with the rights of person, and 
placed on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the Constitution, 
which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and 
property, without due process of law. And an act of Congress which 
deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely 
because he came himself or brought his property into a particular 
Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence 
against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process 
of law.98 
By the alchemy of the Constitution, liberty became the right to expand 
slavery, and due process of law became the capacity to create disposable people 
beyond the law. By naming this alchemy so boldly, of course, Taney inadvertently 
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contributed to overcoming this particular iteration of the constitutional 
construction of statelessness. But, as both the Bush and Obama administrations 
have shown so forcefully, that constitutional option has not been foreclosed. 
